Selection, Trade and Employment : The Strategic Use of Subsidies by Molana, Hassan & Montagna, Catia
  
 Business School  Department of Economics  Centre for European Labour Market Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ECONOMISING, STRATEGISING  
AND 
THE VERTICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRM 
 
 Selection, Trade and Employment: The Strategic Use of Subsidies   Hassan Molana and Catia Montagna 
 Discussion Paper in Economics  No 15-9  November 2015                                     ISSN 0143-4543 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selection, Trade, and Employment:  
the Strategic Use of Subsidies  
 
 
 
Hassan Molana Catia Montagna* 
University of Dundee 
Scottish Institute for Research in Economics  
Tuborg Research Centre for Globalisation 
and Firms, Aarhus 
University of Aberdeen 
Scottish Institute for Research in Economics  
GEP, Nottingham 
Tuborg Research Centre for Globalisation 
and Firms, Aarhus 
  
November 2015 
 
 
Abstract:  We study how the interaction between economic openness and competitive selection 
affects the effectiveness of employment (and entry) subsidisation. Within a two-
country heterogeneous-firms model with endogenous labour supply, we find that 
optimal employment subsidies are always positive even though they can have 
pro- or anti-competitive effects on industry selection depending on whether the 
economy is open or not. We also find that selection effects resulting from 
international competition and fiscal externalities may imply that non-cooperative 
policies entail under-subsidisation of employment. Whilst always having pro-
competitive selection effects on the industry, entry subsidies are shown to be less 
effective in raising employment and welfare than employment subsidies.    
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, welfare state reforms have tended to be characterised by a shift in emphasis 
from the use of passive labour market policies to that of active labour market policies 
(ALMPs). These programmes, often combined with reductions in employment protection 
within the flexicurity model, consist of interventions aimed at reducing search frictions (e.g. 
public employment services) and increasing employability (e.g. training schemes), but also of 
direct job creation measures such as wage and employment subsidies.1  This type of subsidies 
accounted on average for about 25% of total ALMPs in the OECD in 2003 and their use 
intensified during the Great Recession.  In addition, whilst they have often been introduced to 
support specific types of workers (such as the young or the long-term unemployed), they 
have increasingly been perceived as a means to accelerate job recovery2 and demands for 
targeting them towards specific types of firms (as opposed to types of workers) and/or sectors 
have abounded.3  
 The literature on the assessment of the effectiveness of ALMPs typically adopts partial 
equilibrium approaches in which the focus is placed on microeconomic incentives (for 
individual workers, e.g. in seeking work, and for individual firms, e.g. in hiring). These 
policies, however, have implications that go beyond individual agents’ behaviour and affect 
aggregate performance via aggregation effects that start from the industry level. In addition to 
being influenced by the extent of international openness, these effects also work through 
complex channels that are shaped by competitive selection forces within industries – and that 
thus turn out to be an important determinant of the aggregate general equilibrium impact of 
policy.  
 The fact that exposure to international competition enhances competitive selection 
within industries and the role of the latter in determining aggregate productivity and growth 
are now acknowledged by policy makers: whilst helping firms to protect and create jobs in a 
globalised environment by supporting their cost competitiveness is increasingly seen as an 
important complement to growth strategies, there is also an awareness that ‘productivity 
growth requires constant reallocation of resources … from less to more efficient produces’  
(Blanchard et al., 2014).  
                                                 
1 These policies are central to the “European Employment Strategy” to address structural unemployment and to 
increase labour participation and are a cornerstone of the Social Investment model of the welfare state. See 
Andersen and Svarer (2012) for a discussion of the Danish case. The 2013 EU Annual Growth survey, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/annual-growth-surveys/index_en.htm, encourages the 
member states to step up ALMP.  
2 The use of employment and wage subsidies to raise employment during the recent recession was endorsed by 
the ILO-IMF (2010) Conference on “The Challenges of Growth, Employment and Social Cohesion” and have 
recently been advocated by the IMF (2013). Employment subsidy schemes were introduced, e.g. in Germany 
(Kurzarbeitergeld, see OECD, 2009), and in Ireland, while Japan augmented her existing Employment 
Adjustment Subsidy Programme by multiple stimulus packages (Kluve, 2010).  
3 For instance, Marzinotto et al. (2011) suggest that unused EU structural funds could be used to target wage 
subsidies to promote job creation in the exportable sector as a means to reducing external debt burdens. In a 
similar vein, the Irish Exporter Association argued that “the [2009] Employment Subsidy Scheme Second Round 
is too little” and that “spreading the [use of the] Employment Subsidy Fund  will inevitably dilute … [its] impact 
… to support … exports, … key route to balancing the Exchequer and driving the economy out of recession”  
 http://www.irishexporters.ie/section/TheEmploymentSubsidySchemeSecondRoundistoolittle.  
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 In this paper we aim to investigate how the interaction between economic openness and 
competitive selection shapes the effectiveness of ALMPs and governments’ incentives in 
adopting them. In particular, we ask whether employment subsidies can help achieve the type 
of reallocations that can lead to aggregate productivity and employment growth, and how 
their effectiveness is affected by international policy spill-overs.  To address these issues, we 
focus on the optimal determination of employment subsidies in a two-country two-sector 
model characterised by firm heterogeneity (which, in the presence of free-entry and exit, 
results in an endogenous determination of the marginal and average productivity of the 
industry), and endogenous labour supply (which endogenises the aggregate level of 
employment).  
 From a theoretical perspective, an employment subsidy can be justified if it corrects 
distortions that render the market equilibrium suboptimal. Dating back to the pioneering work 
of Pigou (1933) and Kaldor (1936), an extensive literature has examined the impact of 
employment subsidies and the taxation required to finance them.  A significant strand of this 
literature, however, does not rely on general equilibrium frameworks characterised by 
imperfectly competitive goods markets,4 and/or limits the analysis to closed economy 
settings.5  A notable exception is Molana et al. (2012) who study the role of employment 
subsidies as fiscal stimuli in the open economy.6 They show that the effectiveness of 
subsidies in raising the level of economic activity is shaped by a country’s trade openness and 
that governments can act strategically in setting subsidies in the presence of international 
policy externalities. However, their paper does not allow for heterogeneity across firms and 
hence cannot account for the role of competitive selection in determining these effects. 
 Our research is also related to a strand of the literature that highlights the impact of 
intra-industry reallocations on aggregate performance. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) 
find that the size composition of industries interacts with trade openness in determining 
aggregate output volatility. Several studies document how misallocations across 
heterogeneous production units can affect aggregate productivity and the transmission of 
shocks (e.g., Baily et al., 1992; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2010). Of particular interest is the 
fact that different firms exhibit different cyclical patterns of net job creation (Moscarini and 
                                                 
4 The use of employment subsidies to raise employment has been advocated in Johnson (1980), Jackman and 
Layard (1980), Layard and Nickell (1980), Dreze and Malinvaud (1994), Phelps (1994) and Artis and Sinclair 
(1996) among others. Search and matching models, based on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), provide an 
alternative framework within which the effects of employment subsidies have been analysed  for examples, see 
Mortensen and Pissarides (2003), Boone and van Ours (2004) and Cardullo and van der Linden (2006) among 
others. More recently, Brown et al. (2011) have constructed a Markov model of a labour market to compare the 
effectiveness of different employment subsidies.  
5 Within a simple closed economy macroeconomic model with monopolistically competitive markets à la Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977), Fleurbaey (1998) shows that employment subsidies financed by profit taxation take the 
economy closer to the Walrasian equilibrium by countering the negative impact of market power on the level of 
economic activity. 
6 The open economy literature has typically focused on trade policy instruments – see, e.g. Brander and Spencer 
(1985), Venables (1987). Bettendorf and Heijdra (2004) analyse the use of production subsidies (in the presence 
of import tariffs) but their analysis is limited to the case of a small open economy and abstracts from 
distortionary taxes on labour income. More recently, Bilbiie et al. (2008) have studied the effectiveness of 
labour, sales and other subsidies as counter-cyclical stabilisation policy tools in raising employment and output 
within dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, but do not allow for intra-industry selection effects.  
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Postel-Vinay, 2012; Elsby and Michaels, 2013). These papers, however, do not consider the 
interaction between competitive selection on the one hand, and labour market policies aimed 
at increasing employment and trade openness on the other. 
 Another (still fairly small) strand of the literature to which our work is related concerns 
the effects of policy on competitive selection. Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) focus 
on the effects of trade policy in a small open economy, whilst Felbermayr et al. (2013) 
consider non-cooperative tariff policies within a two-country setting.  Contrary to our model, 
both of these papers assume a one sector economy and an exogenous labour supply, and their 
focus is not on employment creation policies.7 Pflüger and Suedekum (2013) develop a two-
country model to analyse strategic interaction between governments in setting entry subsidies 
financed via lump-sum taxation.  
 This paper extends the model developed by Molana et al. (2012) to allow for intra-
industry productivity heterogeneity among firms. Molana et al. (2012) show that employment 
subsidies in the presence of monopolistic distortions affect the endogenous level of 
employment. By relaxing the assumption of symmetry in firms’ producitivy, in this paper we 
show that employment subsidies also have an impact on aggregate efficiency via reallocation 
effects across countries, sectors, and firms within sectors. Ultimately, by subsidising 
employment, the government controls the selectivity of competition and contributes to 
correcting the market distortion (arising from differences in mark-up between the 
monopolistic good on the one hand and leisure, an outside good, and the imported varieties 
on the other) that results in an under-consumption of the differentiated good.  Crucially, 
international openness alters the effects of the policy on selection and aggregate productivity. 
Whilst in autarky the optimal employment subsidy, by softening competition, has anti-
competitive effects on the economy, in the open economy it has pro-competitive effects and 
results in a higher average productivity of firms. International spillovers, consisting of 
selection and fiscal externalities, lead to non-cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria 
that are characterised by positive subsidies.  Whether the non-cooperative solutions entail 
levels of subsidisation that exceed or are short of those characterising the cooperative 
outcome hinges, however, on the nature of the externality between countries which in turn 
depends on how the subsidy is targeted.  
 Reforms of product markets – particularly aimed at facilitating entry – are considered as 
an effective means to increase aggregate productivity and employment.8 Our analysis of an 
entry subsidy reveals that whilst it always has pro-competitive selection effects on the 
industry, it is less effective in raising employment and welfare than an employment subsidy. 
This is due to the fact that the latter enables the government to tackle the monopolistic 
distortion more directly.      
                                                 
7 In a recent paper, Haaland and Venables (2014) derive optimal domestic sales subsidies, import tariffs and 
export subsidies in a two sector model of a small open economy. By allowing for labour supply in the 
monopolistic sector to be flexible or fixed, the model allows to generalise results obtain via special cases in the 
literature.  
8 As Blanchard et al. (2014) state, “Structural reform in product markets – particularly lowering barriers to 
entry of new firms – is likely to produce a larger growth payoff than reform in labor markets”.  
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 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the closed economy 
case. Section 3 extends the model to a two-country setting, and Section 4 analyses the 
strategic subsidy games between governments. Section 5 examines the role of trade 
liberalisation and productivity shocks. Section 6 compares the impact of employment and 
entry subsidies, and Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  Closed economy 
Consider an economy consisting of two sectors, one imperfectly and one perfectly 
competitive, respectively producing a horizontally differentiated good and a homogeneous 
commodity. Labour supply is endogenous and a government employment subsidy in the 
differentiated sector is financed via proportional income taxation.  
 
2.1. Demand and technology  
The population of consumers is characterised by a representative household with N identical 
members which are either employed or unemployed. We assume that an employed worker is 
required (by legislation) to supply a fixed number of work hours (which is normalised to 
unity), a fraction h of household members are employed, and the total household income is 
equally shared amongst its members (unemployed members are ‘insured’ in this sense even if 
there is no unemployment benefit per se; see e.g., Andolfatto, 1996; Merz, 1995). The 
corresponding utility function and the budget constraint, written at the household level, are   
 
1 1
, 0 1, 0, 0, 0
1 1
A Y NhU N
       
                 
, (1) 
  1A YP A P Y N t wh   , (2) 
where A and AP  are quantity consumed and price of the homogenous commodity, Y and YP  
are the quantity consumed and price of the differentiated good, w is the wage rate, and t is the 
proportional income tax rate.9 The aggregate labour supply function and the demand 
functions for the two goods are, respectively,  
        1/1 1 1 1,  and ,s ss
A Y
t w t wL t wL
L Nh N A Y
P P P
  

         
 (3) 
where 1A YP P P
   is the consumer price index. Y is assumed to be a CES bundle of 
differentiated varieties with ‘dual’ price index YP , respectively given by 
 
1 1
1 1/ 1
1 1/ 1( )   and   ( ) ,Y
i M i M
Y y i di P p i di
    
 
             (4) 
                                                 
9 We concentrate on proportional income taxation since it accounts for the bulk of tax revenue from the personal 
sector in advanced industrial economies.  
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where M is the set of available varieties, y(i) and p(i) are the quantity consumed and the price 
of variety i respectively, and  >1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties. 
The demand for each variety is then  
 ( )( )
Y
p iy i Y
P
    
,       i M . (5) 
 The homogenous good is produced under perfectly competitive conditions using a 
constant returns to scale technology with a unit labour requirement of one, i.e. sAL A , 
where AL  and 
sA  denote the labour demand and the quantity supplied by this sector, 
respectively. Given the assumed technology, the zero-profit condition and free mobility of 
labour across the two sectors imply Aw P . We use this good as the numeraire and normalise 
1AP  , which in turn implies 1w   and YP P . 
 In the differentiated good sector, each firm employs labour as the only input to produce 
one variety of the good using a linear technology with increasing returns to scale. Dropping 
the variety indicator i and distinguishing firms by their productivity parameter  1,  , the 
labour requirement to produce and market a quantity y of the good is    yl     , where 
 is the fixed labour requirement. A firm’s profit is           1p y s l       , where 
[0,1)s  is the employment subsidy rate that the firm receives from the government. Profit 
maximisation under standard monopolistically competitive assumptions then yields the 
familiar mark-up rule:     
1
1
s
p
  
  . Given this, and revenue      r p y   , 
operating profits are:      / 1r s       .  
 As in Melitz (2003), before they can set up and start producing, a large pool F of 
identical potential entrants each pay a fixed entry sunk cost f, measured in terms of the 
numeraire good, that enables them to draw a productivity parameter from a common 
population with a known p.d.f. ( )g  , defined over support  1,   with a continuous 
cumulative distribution ( )G  . A firm’s survival in the market will depend on the magnitude 
of its   in relation to the threshold c  which satisfies   0c    and defines the marginal 
firms; firms with  1, c    will not enter since they would make a loss, while those with 
 ,c    will make non-negative profits.  Prior to entry, therefore, it is known that a 
fraction  cG   of F will be unsuccessful, while a fraction   1 cM G F   will succeed 
and start production. Thus, ex-post, M is the mass of varieties available to consumers. We can 
therefore redefine the p.d.f. of the surviving firms over [ , )c    by     1 c
g
G
    , 
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which can then be used to obtain a measure of the aggregate productivity of the industry as 
the weighted average of operating firms’ productivity levels [ , )c   ,10 
  
1
1
1
c
d



    
 
      . (6) 
Using ( ) / ( ) /c cp p     ,  ( ) / ( ) /c cy y       and ( ) ( ) ( )r p y   , we obtain 
   
1 1
( ) ( ) 1
( )c c c
r r s
r
      
             
   .  
All the relevant variables can then be written in terms of c  and  . In particular, the industry 
price level, operating profits and labour demand are respectively given by   
   1/(1 )
1
1Y
s
P M 

 
    ,  (7) 
   
1
( ) 1 1
c
s
   
         
 , (8) 
  
1
( ) 1 1
c
l
   
         
 . (9) 
 Finally, the indirect per capita utility can be written as    
 
1
1
U hu
N
 

   , (10) 
which is monotonically increasing in h. Thus, maximising u is equivalent to maximising h. 
 
2.2. General equilibrium and policy analysis 
Entry continues until the expected net entry profit is zero, i.e.   0M Ff    ,  which we 
write as 
       1 0M r s l Ff      . (11) 
 The aggregate market clearing conditions for the labour, differentiated good and 
homogeneous good markets are, respectively  
   sAL Ml L  , (12) 
                                                 
10 To see this, define  
1
1 ( ) / ( ) ( )y y d

      

         and note that the weight    /y y   is given by  /
   which 
can be substituted back in the definition of   to obtain (6).  
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    1 sMr t L   , (13) 
 sA fF A  , (14) 
where    1 1 sA t L   , and s AA L .  
 Finally, the government budget constraint is11 
   ssMl tL  . (15) 
  The above equations complete the model, which consists of 14 equations and 14 
unknowns: F, M, sL , AL ,  l  , A, sA , YP ,      , , , , cr y          and either the tax rate t 
or the subsidy rate s.12 In order to obtain explicit solutions, we adopt the Pareto distribution 
and let  
      (1 )1 and   , 1, ,G g             (16) 
where the shape parameter   provides an inverse measure of dispersion.13 Then, 
 1 c cG      and (17) imply  
 1 1
1 c
   
      
 .  (18) 
Making use of (18), we rewrite (11) as 
   11 0
1
M s Ff  
       .  (19) 
Given (16),   1 cM G F   implies cM F   which can then be substituted into (19) to 
obtain the equilibrium value of the productivity cut-off,  
    
1/
1 1
1c
s
f
   
       
.  (20) 
                                                 
11 We assume that the government sets a uniform subsidy rate common to all firms in the industry. This 
assumption reflects the fact that, due to the informational requirements of firm-specific intervention, 
governments often choose to use fairly ‘blunt’ policy instruments, targeted to ‘groups’ or categories of agents. 
Note, however, that with CES preferences (where firms’ mark-up, and hence the monopolistic distortion 
addressed by the subsidy, does not depend on their productivity) the subsidy should be the same for all firms – 
contrary to the case of firm-specific market power where it is well known that first-best policies depend on 
firms’ productivity – see e.g., Leahy and Montagna (2001) and Nocco et al. (2014).  
12 Note that in general equilibrium one of the market clearing conditions, e.g. the homogeneous goods market 
equilibrium in (14), can be obtained from the rest and is therefore redundant.   
13 In the Pareto distribution, both mean and variance are negatively related to the shape parameter Thus, the 
smaller is , the higher is the average firm’s efficiency and the higher is the productivity dispersion. To obtain 
meaningful results we impose >-1. 
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As is clear from (20), 0c
  : the minimum productivity required to survive in equilibrium 
is positively related to the degree of heterogeneity between firms. Moreover, 0c
s
  : a 
higher subsidy softens competition, making it easier to survive in equilibrium.   
 For a given s, and treating t as endogenous, the model can be solved (see the Appendix 
for details) to express all endogenous variables in terms of s. The corresponding equilibrium 
tax rate is given by 
     
1
1 1
s
t s
s s
  
   
      .  (21) 
 
 The indirect utility function in (10) is a monotonic function of h which, from (3), is in 
turn given by 
1/
1
Y
th
P


     . Thus, a subsidy affects welfare via three channels: the tax rate 
and, through YP , the mass of varieties and the average industry productivity. Using (21) and 
the solution for YP  to evaluate h, we obtain the solution  h s  which can be shown to be 
strictly concave in s. Thus, given that 0c
s
   also holds, it is welfare-improving to subsidise 
employment and to soften competitive selection in the monopolistic sector. Furthermore, 
 h s  reaches a unique maximum at   
     
1
0
1
opts
     
    ,  (22) 
where 0
optds
d  . Hence: the lower is the degree of productivity heterogeneity between firms, 
the larger is the optimal subsidy since, at higher values of , the subsidy has a lower marginal 
effect. Consistently, by substituting (22) into (20), it can be easilty verified that 0
opt
c

  , 
i.e. the optimal value of the productivity cut-off is lower (and so is the optimal average 
productivity in the industry) the more homogeneous are firms.  
 It is instructive to point out that the homogenous firms scenario analysed by Molana et 
al.  (2012), that can be considered as a useful benchmark for the present analysis, can be 
obtained  in our model by letting    , which corresponds to the case in which all firms 
draw the same productivity level with probability one, which occurs for    . As is clear 
from equation (22), 1lim opts     and   lim 1
opt
c   . Given the firm’s optimal price rule, 
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    
1
1
s w
p
  
  , this implies that when firms are homogenous  optcp w    holds. 
Thus, as discussed in Molana et al. (2012), with homogenous productivities, the optimal 
subsidy eliminates the mark-up margin ( 1)   , fully correcting the monopolistic 
distortion. More generally, the extent to which the subsidy addresses this distortion is directly 
related to the size of , i.e. it increases in the degree of homogeneity of firms. The 
monopolistic distortion, due to the fact that the differentiated good is priced at a mark-up 
while leisure and the homogenous good are not, results in a wedge between the marginal rate 
of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation between leisure and the homogenous 
good on the one hand and the differentiated good on the other. Consequently, the market 
outcome is characterised by a sub-optimal level of the consumption of the differentiated 
product and an excessive consumption of the homogenous good and leisure. In contributing 
to correct this distortion, the subsidy reduces the share of employment in the homogenous 
good sector14 
  
 
1
1
1
AL
sL
s
 
   
       
,  (23) 
which is negatively related to s.  
   Intuitively, by reducing firms’ costs and making it easier for them to survive in 
equilibrium, the subsidy softens competition and this works towards increasing entry.  As 
shown in the Appendix, the mass of firms is concave in s, but reaches a maximum at a 
subsidy level that exceeds the value that maximises employment. Thus, increasing the 
subsidy up to its optimum level expands the mass of firms in the industry, which contributes 
towards raising welfare and aggregate employment (and will also have procompetitive effects 
that partially offset the initial competition softening effects of the subsidy). However, as is 
clear from (21), an increase in subsidy raises the tax rate, which reduces labour supply and 
welfare. In addition, the lower average productivity in the industry contributes to offsetting 
the initial price-reducing effect of the subsidy. Taken together, these forces underpin the 
concavity of  h s .15  
                                                 
14 See Bilbiie et al. (2008) and Molana et al. (2012) for further discussion. The effects of cost heterogeneity on 
the optimality of the market solution has been examined by Dhingra and Morrow (2015) for the CES and VES 
cases and by Nocco et al. (2014) for quasi-linear demands. Dhingra and Morrow (2015) show that in a one-
sector-heterogeneous-CES world, the market solution corresponds to the first best – i.e. how the market 
allocates resources across firms does not matter (and the optimal policy is laissez faire). When, as in our case, 
mark-ups differ across sectors, the monopolistic distortion leads to inefficient market allocations that can be 
corrected by policy – to an extent that, as we show, depends on the degree of heterogeneity among firm 
productivities.  
15 Note that a higher value of  is associated with a lower mass of firms and a lower aggregate employment. 
Thus, the skewedness of the productivity distribution matters in determining the effectiveness of the subsidy 
policy i.e.   , opt opt opt optopt opt optdL L L dsL L s d s d          , where 
2
20, 0
opt optdL d L
d d   . Hence, ceteris paribus, a fall 
in productivity heterogeneity (i.e. a higher value of ) will result in a lower aggregate employment in 
equilibrium, despite a higher optimal subsidy rate. 
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 In sum, by reducing the selectivity of competition in the monopolistic industry, the 
subsidy triggers a reallocation of resources across the two production sectors, away from 
leisure and – within the monopolistic sector – away from the most efficient and towards less 
efficient firms. Despite its anti-competitive effects, an optimally chosen subsidy leads to 
welfare gains.  
 
3.  A two-country setting  
In this section we extend the model to a two-country setting. Both economies (home and 
foreign) are characterised by the same consumer preferences and technologies discussed in 
the autarkic model above. The homogenous good (that we retain as the numeraire) is freely 
traded whilst the differentiated good is traded at a per-unit iceberg trade cost,  >1. We shall 
denote the foreign country’s variables by an asterisk and focus the discussion of the two-
country model on the home country.  
 The differentiated product aggregator and its price index are now respectively given by 
 
* * * *
1 1
1 1/ 1
1 1/ * 1 1/ 1 * 1( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ,
x x
d x Y d x
i M i Mi M M i M M
Y y i di y i di P p i di p i di
 
   
 
   
    
                    (24) 
where the subscripts d and x refer to domestically consumed and exported varieties, 
respectively – thus, e.g., *xy  and 
*
xp  are the quantity and price of foreign exported varieties 
consumed in the home country. Demand for the domestic and foreign varieties of the 
differentiated good are respectively given by 
 
*
*( ) ( )( ) , ( ) .d xd x
Y Y
p i p iy i Y y i Y
P P
            
 (25) 
 The possibility of trade implies that firms in the monopolistic sector will have to decide 
after entry whether to produce for the domestic market only or whether to also export. In 
addition to the fixed entry cost f and the fixed cost d  required for production of dy , an 
exporting firm also incurs a fixed cost x  (also in terms of labour) for producing and 
marketing the output xy  it sells abroad. Given the higher complexity of operating in foreign 
markets, it is plausible to assume d < x .   
 As in the autarkic case, we shall assume that the government does not set firm-specific 
subsidies. However, the openness of the economy results in the possibility of broad 
categories of firms/activities to be targeted – e.g. consistent with the pressures for some form 
of employment support to be directed to exporters or ‘high quality job’ firms during the 
recent recession.  Hence, we shall briefly examine an ‘export-only’ subsidy, xs , for labour 
employed in the production for exports, and a ‘domestic-only’ subsidy, ds  for labour 
employed in production for domestic sales, in addition to the ‘uniform’ employment subsidy 
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case, d xs s s  . A firm’s profits from domestic and foreign sales are then given respectively 
by 
                    1 , 1 ,d d d d d x x x x xp y s wl p y s wl                (26) 
where   
        ,d xd d x xy yl l          . (27) 
Maximisation of (26) subject to the demand functions in (25) and labour requirements in (26) 
implies the following optimal price rules for a firm with productivity   serving both markets: 
       
 
 
1 1
, .
1 1
d x
d x
s w s w
p p
      
     (28) 
 
3.1. The general equilibrium  
The competitive selection process that follows entry will result in the emergence of two 
productivity cut-offs, defined by  sup : ( ) 0d d d      and  sup : ( ) 0x x x     , that 
respectively correspond to the productivity of the marginal firms that survive in the domestic 
market and to that of the marginal exporters. Thus, the possibility of international trade, and 
the fact that trade is costly, will result in a partitioning between exporting and non-exporting 
firms. Only relatively more productive firms will afford to export and x  determines the 
partition between the two types of firm: for a given mass of entrants F, a mass 
  1 d dM G F F     of firms with productivity  ,d    will survive and produce 
for the domestic market and a subset of these, with mass   1x x xM G F F     and 
with productivity  ,x   , will also produce and export to the foreign country. Following 
the same procedure as in autarky, for any given d  and x  we obtain the corresponding 
average productivities, 
 
1/( 1) 1/( 1)
, .
1 1d d x x
        
              
   (29) 
 The zero expected net entry profits condition implies that 
    0d d x x x AM M P f F        always hold in equilibrium. The labour market clearing 
condition is   
     ,sA d d x x xL Ml M l L       (30) 
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where, as in autarky, sAL A  and  
1/
1
1s
A Y
t w
L N
P P

  
    
. The balanced government budget 
constraint and the trade balance equation are, respectively 
      sd d d x x x xw s Ml s M l twL    ,  (31) 
      * * *sA x x x x x xP A A f F M r M r      . (32) 
 Finally, the model is closed by noting that, since the homogenous good is freely traded, 
* * 1A Aw P w P    . As shown in the Appendix, we reduce the model to 12 equations which 
can be solved to determine * * * * * *, , , , , , , , , , ,d x d x Y YF F P P h h t t    . Using these equations, 
the following relationships can be shown to hold in general equilibrium between the two 
countries’ productivity cut-offs:  
 
   
/( 1) 1/( 1) /( 1) 1/( 1)* * *
*
* * *
1 1, .
1 1
x x x x x x
d d d d d d
s s
s s
            
                           
 (33) 
 
These imply that, for any given level of and * , subsidy policies in the two countries 
trigger selection effects that will result in changes in the efficiency composition of the 
industry (and hence in market structure) in both countries.  
  
3.2. The effects of employment subsidies  
The model can be solved recursively to first determine the two countries’ productivity cut-
offs  * *, , ,d x d x     by considering four equations consisting of (33) above and the zero 
expected net profits of entry equations which can be written as (see the Appendix):  
 
     
     * * * ** * * * * *
1
1 1 ,
1
1
1 1 .
1
d d d x x x
d d d x x x
f
s s
f
s s
 
 
     
     
 
 
     
     
                                             (34) 
We now impose full symmetry, i.e.    * * * * *, , , , = , , , ,d x d xf f        , on (32) and (33). 
Focussing on a uniform subsidy (by letting  x ds s s   and * * *x ds s s  ) and allowing for the 
two countries’ subsidies to differ (i.e. *s s ), we obtain the solutions for the productivity cut-
offs for the home country: 
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     
1//( 1) 1 [ /( 1) 1]
1/
/( 1) 1 /( 1) 1*
1 1
1 1
1
x x
d dd
d
x
d
s
f s
s
   
 
   

        
    

   
                                   
, (35) 
 
    
1//( 1) 1 [ /( 1) 1]
1/
[ /( 1) 1]/( 1) 1*
1 1
1 1
1
x x
d dx
x
x
d
s
f s
s
   
 
  

        
    

   

                                  
. (36) 
These can be substituted into (33) to obtain the corresponding expressions for the foreign 
country. Inspections of the cut-offs reveals that with full symmetry and for any given *s , a 
unilateral rise in  s increases d  and *x  (which rises even more than d  does) and reduces 
x , and *d .16   
 Equations (35), (36) and the corresponding equations determining the foreign 
productivity cut-offs can then be used to obtain the mass of firms characterising the 
equilibrium.  While this could not be done analytically, our extensive numerical analysis 
shows that an increase in uniform subsidy in the home country will lead to greater entry (F), a 
larger mass of surviving firms (M) characterised by a higher average efficiency ( d ), and a 
larger extensive margin of export  /xM M . It will also have the opposite effects on the 
foreign country, which experiences a reduced entry  *F , a smaller mass of surviving firms 
 *M  characterised by a lower average efficiency  *d , and a smaller extensive margin of 
export  * */xM M .  
 Thus, contrary to what happens in autarky, a unilateral increase in uniform employment 
subsidy to all home firms has a pro-competitive selection effect on the monopolistic industry. 
To begin with, as in autarky, the policy has an anti-competitive effect on the monopolistic 
sector: by lowering labour costs, it will initially work towards a reduction of both the 
domestic and the export productivity cut-offs. By softening competition and making it easier 
to survive in the domestic market and to export, this effect will bring about entry – which, as 
noted for the autarkic cas, will partially offset the initial anticompetitive impact of the policy. 
The openness of the economy introduces another pro-competitive effect, however.  As is 
reflected in the positive relationship between d  and *x , the reduction of d  triggered by the 
                                                 
16 This holds for the unilateral case as long as, for the given values of  *, ,d xs   , the value of  is sufficiently 
large to ensure positivity of the denominators of (34) and (35). However, this qualification is not required for 
symmetric solutions since the denominators of (34) and (35) are positive for all  ൒1 given that 
 and 1x d      . 
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subsidy makes it easier for foreign exporters to penetrate the domestic market. This toughens 
the degree of import competition for domestic firms and exerts an upward pressure on d . 
The  net effect  of the subsidy is an increase in the domestic productivity cut-off and in the 
size of the monopolistic industry. Moreover, the subsidy has an adverse selection effect on 
the foreign country, which results from an expenditure switching across countries, with 
consumption of imported varieties falling in favour of domestic ones – an effect that, together 
with the increase in the mass of home country exporters, underpins a contraction of the 
monopolistic sector in the foreign country.  
 
4.  Welfare and optimal policy in the symmetric case  
Retaining the assumption of symmetry between countries, in this section we study the 
optimal policy. As in autarky, utility is monotonically increasing in employment – which we 
continue to use to proxy welfare. Given the complexity of the algebra involved, however, we 
now use numerical solutions to illustrate the optimal policy and its effects.17  
 
4.1. Uniform subsidies  
Letting x ds s s   and * * *x ds s s  , we indicate the solution for employment in the home and 
foreign country by  *,h s s  and  * *,h s s  which can be shown to be concave in s (for any 
given *s ) and in *s  (for any given s), respectively. In Figure 1 we plot, for a few different 
values of *s , sections of  * ,h s s  in  ,s h  space which show that, for all relevant values of 
*s ,  *,h s s  is strictly concave in s and has a unique maximum at some 0<s<1. Thus, each 
country has a unilateral incentive to set a positive employment subsidy.  
 
Figure 1. Sections of home country’s welfare function  * ,h s s  in  ,s h  space  
(for different values of *s ) 
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17 Our calibration of the parameters is consistent with those widely used in the literature for this type of models, 
see, e.g., Felbermayr et al. (2011). See Table A3 in the Appendix for the parameter values used in our solutions. 
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 The concavity of a country’s welfare function with respect to its own subsidy stems 
from the positive selection effects of the policy discussed in the previous section together 
with negative fiscal effects: the welfare function exhibits a trade-off between the combined 
effect of the larger mass of firms and their higher average productivity (which implies that 
consumers gain both at the extensive and at the intensive margin because of a higher variety 
and lower average prices) and the higher tax rate required to finance the increase in the 
subsidy.18  
  Clearly, the externalities of a unilateral change in subsidy by the home country’s 
government will affect the foreign country’s policy incentives. When both governments are 
policy active, their reaction functions and the resulting Nash equilibrium can be obtained 
using the iterative numerical solution method by maximising (sequentially and in turn) 
 *,h s s  and  * *,h s s , which are symmetric, holding the other country’s subsidy constant. 
Our numerical analysis suggests that 
 2 *
*
,
0
h s s
s s
    and 
 2 * *
*
,
0
h s s
s s
    which imply that the 
two countries’ subsidies are strategic complements and the two reaction functions are upward 
sloping in  * ,s s  space. We also find that the welfare functions are saddle-shaped, implying 
that the policy externality is non-monotonic. To explain this, consider the effects of increases 
in the foreign subsidy rates on home welfare. As *s  increases, while the optimal value of s 
rises, the corresponding maximum value of  * ,h s s  falls initially and then rises as *s  
exceeds a threshold value. Figure 1 illustrates this property. The left panel shows the negative 
externality region for *s : as *s  is raised,  *,h s s  shifts down and its maximum moves to the 
right; thus whilst the policy choices exhibit strategic complementarity throughout, in this 
region the raising of *s  is an ‘unfriendly move’ by the foreign country. There is however a 
threshold for *s  at which the raising of *s  becomes a ‘friendly move’.  This is shown in the 
right panel of Figure 1: as *s  is raised,  *,h s s  shifts up and its maximum still moves to the 
right. Figure 2 shows the home governments’ reaction function  *, 0RF s s   and the 
corresponding iso-welfare contours in the  * ,s s  space. While the reaction function is 
upward sloping in the  * ,s s  space, the shape and hierarchy of the iso-welfare loci change at 
the threshold level of *s  denoted by *sˆ . This occurs at the intersection of the RF with the 45o 
degree line which, given the assumed symmetry, corresponds to the Nash equilibrium 
solution  * ,N Ns s . 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Other things equal, the increase in a country’s tax rate is higher the larger is its mass of firms.  
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Figure 2. The iso-welfare contours and the reaction function for the home country with 
uniform employment subsidy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 Note:  (i) *sˆ  is the threshold at which externality switches; (ii) 0s   is the unilateral optimal subsidy when 
* 0s  ; (iii) RF is approximated by a straight line for simplicity to emphasise its monotonicity and 
slope relative to the 45o line.  
 
 Figure 3 depicts both governments’ reaction functions. As can be seen from the figure, 
the cooperative solution  * ,C Cs s , in which the two governments jointly choose subsidies to 
maximise the sum of the two countries’s welfare, lies above the Nash equilibrium, i.e. 
   * *, ,C C N Ns s s s , since it occurs in the positive externality region. Hence, the non-
cooperative behaviour entails under-subsidisation from a global welfare point of view. Table 
A3 in the Appendix provides a comparison of the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions 
with the no-policy benchmark solution (see columns labelled “Initial Case”). 
 
Figure 3.  Nash and cooperative solutions with uniform employment subsidy 
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As discussed in the previous section, a unilateral increase in subsidy in one country has 
negative selection and variety effects on its competitor’s industry that amount to an 
international reallocation of resources across countries within the monopolistic sector.19 This 
can be seen by comparing the “Employment Subsidy” and “No Policy Benchmark” columns 
of Table A4 in the Appendix which show that a unilateral increase in s raises d  as well as 
*
x  and results in lower *F , *d , and *xM .  In addition, the policy has a positive fiscal 
externality on the foreign country: since an increase in s negatively affects the mass of 
foreign firms and exporters, it can be shown to reduce the foreign government’s subsidy bill 
(for a given * 0s  ), thus enabling the foreign government to reduce its tax rate for a given 
level of subsidy (or to increase the subsidy rate for a given tax rate). Overall, the trading 
partner initially experiences a fall in welfare that gives rise to an incentive to retaliate.  
Consistently, this retaliation by the foreign country has a welfare reducing (and anti-
competitive) effect on the home country. 
 As is evident from Table A3, welfare at the Nash equilibrium is higher than in the no-
policy case, even though both countries experience a worsening of their firms’ productivity 
distribution (reflected in a fall in the domestic cut-off relative to the no-policy case). Up to 
 * ,N Ns s , there are negative policy externalities, as the negative selection and variety effects 
dominate the positive fiscal-spill-over effects. The Nash equilibrium occurs where the 
negative selection and variety effects are exactly offset by the positive fiscal spill-over 
effects. However, when setting their policies non-cooperatively, the two governments fail to 
internalise the fact that raising subsidies above the Nash equilibrium level would generate a 
positive externality since the negative selection and variety effects would then be dominated 
by the positive fiscal-spill-over effects.  The cooperative behaviour, where these positive 
externalities are ‘jointly exploited’, leads to an equilibrium at    * *, ,C C N Ns s s s  which yields 
higher welfare level.     
 
4.2 Targeted employment subsidies 
Given that export performance is often seen as crucial to employment growth, we now briefly 
consider the effects of an ‘export-only’ employment subsidy (i.e. 0, 0x ds s  ). If used 
unilaterally, this policy has the same qualitative effects on the two countries’ productivity 
cut-offs as a uniform subsidy: by increasing the domestic cut-off and reducing the export 
productivity cut-offs it has pro-competitive effects on the domestic industry and triggers a 
reallocation of resources towards relatively more efficient firms.  However, since, by 
discriminating in favour of the export activity of firms, the ‘export-only’ subsidy is biased 
                                                 
19 These two effects combine to produce an increase in the foreign price index *YP . This negative spill-over is 
partially mitigated by the fact that the average productivity of home country’s exporters is lower as a result of 
the subsidy – and hence the average price of imported varieties in the foreign country is now higher, softening 
competition for foreign firms in their domestic market. 
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towards relatively more efficient firms in the industry, the reallocation effect is relatively 
stronger in this case.  
 As with the uniform subsidy, an employment subsidy targeted to exports has a negative 
efficiency spill-over and a positive fiscal spill-over effect on the trading partner. In this case, 
however, the latter is smaller (due to the relatively smaller subsidy bill arising from 
subsidising only exporting activities) and never dominates, so that the overall externality 
effect is always negative. This case is illustrated in Figure 4 where, similar to the uniform 
subsidy case, the reactions functions of the two countries are upward sloping.  
 
Figure 4.  Nash and cooperative solutions with export-only 
employment subsidy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, due to the monotonic nature of the inter-country negative externality, the 
cooperative solution now lies below the Nash equilibrium level of subsidy: by failing to 
internalise the negative externality, the non-cooperative behaviour of the governments entails 
over-subsidisation from a global welfare point of view.   
 It is also interesting to briefly consider the effects of a ‘domestic-only’ subsidy (i.e. 
0, 0d xs s  ) where the employment subsidy is targeted towards the domestic operation of 
firms. This policy, which is clearly biased towards relatively less efficient firms, softens 
selection in the home market (i.e. contrary to the previous two cases, it reduces the domestic 
productivity cut-off) and thus reallocates resources away from more efficient and towards 
relatively less efficient firms. In so doing, this policy achieves the strongest ‘home-market 
effect’ and leads to the largest negative externality on the foreign country (via its strongest 
market stealing effect). In this case, as shown in Figure 5, the two governments’ reaction 
functions are downward sloping, since the subsidies are strategic substitutes and the negative 
externality induces governments to over-subsidise when acting non-cooperatively, with the 
cooperative solution lying below the Nash equilibrium. 
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Figure 5. Nash and cooperative solutions with domestic-only 
employment subsidy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Trade liberalisation and productivity shocks  
As is well established in the literature, in this type of model trade liberalisation (i.e. a 
reduction in trade costs) typically has pro-competitive effects on an industry, and reallocates 
resources towards more efficient firms. In our model, trade liberalisation also strengthens the 
pro-competitive effects of an employment subsidy.  
 Figure 6 illustrates the effects of a 5% reduction in trade costs on the effectiveness of 
unilateral increases in uniform employment subsidy by the home government when the 
foreign government is policy inactive: as the graph in the left panel shows, increases in s raise 
d  and this effect is stronger the lower are trade costs.  
 
Figure 6.  Impact of unilateral uniform employment subsidy policy by home country (s* = 0) 
as trade costs fall by 5%
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Thus, the standard competitive selection forces triggered by trade liberalisation strengthen the 
pro-competitive effects of the subsidy discussed earlier.  As a result, the unilateral optimal 
subsidy is lower and its welfare effects are higher at lower trade costs, as illustrated in the 
right panel of Figure 6.    
 As can be seen from Table A3, trade liberalisation also results in a lower Nash 
equilibrium subsidy and hence in a much higher degree of under-subsidisation relative to the 
cooperative solution – therefore suggesting much stronger policy externalities beyond the 
Nash equilibrium when trade barriers are lower. This is because whilst the Nash equilibrium 
subsidy falls in , the optimal subsidy in the symmetric cooperative case is unaffected by 
trade costs. To see this, consider that the equilibrium solutions for subsidy and tax levels in 
the cooperative case cannot be distinguished from the corresponding solutions in the autarkic 
case given by equations (19), (20) and (21) – see also Table A3 for our numerical solutions. 
Specifically, the (reduced form) objective functions are      * * * * *, ; , , ; , ;h s s h s s h s        
which can be written as      h s h s   where  h s  is the corresponding autarkic (reduced 
form) employment equation and     is a monotonically decreasing function with 0  , 
 1 >1 and   1   . 
 Our discussion of the autarkic case implies that, whilst the existence of heterogeneity in 
the CES framework does not alter the qualitative arguments for employment subsidisation, it 
affects the size of the optimal policy – with the optimal subsidy increasing in . Table A3 
reports the effects of a 5% reduction in on the Nash and cooperative equilibria. A fall in  
corresponds to an increase in the degree of heterogeneity of firms’ productivity, and can 
hence be thought of as a positive productivity shock.  In the no-subsidy equilibrium this 
leads, as we would expect, to an increase in welfare and to a reallocation of resources towards 
the monopolistic sector driven by an increase in both domestic and export productivity cut-
offs that raise the average productivity in that sector. With policy active governments, the 
same productivity shock results in the non-cooperative equilibrium being characterised by 
higher subsidies. Thus, contrary to the autarkic and cooperative case, the non-cooperative 
equilibrium is characterised by a positive relationship between the optimal subsidy and the 
degree of heterogeneity of firms the opposite relationship.20 The degree of under-
subsidisation relative to the cooperative solution would also be higher at lower values of  – 
i.e. with more efficient productivity distributions, subsidising above the Nash level would 
generate larger positive policy externalities which non-cooperative policies fail to internalise.  
 
 
  
                                                 
20 Consistently, we have verified numerically that if the home country had a productivity distribution 
characterised by a higher heterogeneity than its trading partner (i.e. < a unilateral subsidy when the foreign 
government is not policy active would be more effective in raising welfare and employment and hence the 
optimal subsidy would be lower than when countries’ productivity distributions are symmetric. 
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6.  Entry subsidies: a comparison  
Given the role of entry in facilitating reallocations towards more efficient producers, the 
reduction of entry barriers is seen as an effective way to increase aggregate productivity and 
employment. To this end, governments implement policies (ranging from simplifying red 
tape procedures to start-up grants) to support entrepreneurship and induce the setting up of 
new firms.  
 In this section we briefly examine the effect of entry subsidies on aggregate 
productivity and employment against those of employment subsidies discussed above. In 
order to allow for a direct comparison between the two types of subsidies, we modify our 
model to replace employment subsidies s with an ad-valorem entry subsidy   (i.e. 
proportional to a firm’s entry cost f) which is again financed via proportional income 
taxation. Thus, setting s= 0 in the autarkic model developed in Section 2 and introducing   
instead, the government budget constraint in equation (15) becomes 
 sfF tL  .  (37) 
Since the subsidy reduces the effective cost of entry, the expected zero-profit entry condition 
in (11) is now given by 
      (1 ) 0M r l f F       .  (38) 
Note that because the entry subsidy does not affect firms’ marginal conditions, the average 
industry revenues and profits are not affected by the subsidy.  
 The autarkic productivity cut-off is now given by  
    
1/
1
1 1c f
    
       
,  (39) 
which is increasing in v. Thus, as in Pflüger and Suedekum (2013) and contrary to the 
employment subsidy case discussed above, an entry subsidy has a pro-competitive effect, and 
this effect is stronger the higher is the degree of heterogeneity among firms (i.e. the lower is 
). The welfare function in (10) can be shown to be strictly concave in v with the 
corresponding optimal entry subsidy in autarky given by 
   
1
1
opt     
   ,  (40) 
which is positive and decreasing in . Hence, in contrast to the employment subsidy case, the 
more homogenous are firms the lower are the optimal entry subsidy and industry average 
productivity. A comparison between equations (22) and (40) and the corresponding welfare 
levels reveals that opt opts   and    opt opth h s  : ceteris paribus, (i) the optimal entry subsidy 
rate is smaller than the optimal employment subsidy rate, and (ii) the optimal employment 
subsidy is associated with higher employment and welfare levels. To see this consider that 
the procompetitive effects of the entry subsidy can be shown to result in a fall in the mass of 
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surviving firms.21  Instead, an increase in the mass of firms contributes to explain why the 
optimal employment subsidy, despite its anti-competitive effects on the industry in autarky, 
leads to higher levels of welfare than an entry subsidy.  More generally, underpinning these 
results is the fact that an employment subsidy offers a more direct way, than an entry subsidy, 
to tackle the monopolistic distortion in this model.22 
 Moving to the two-country setting, the solutions for the unilateral, Nash and 
cooperative policy equilibria are given in Table A4. As can be seen from the table, 
governments have a unilateral incentive to subsidise the entry of firms. However, contrary to 
autarky, the unilateral (i.e. when the trading partner’s government is policy inactive) optimal 
entry subsidy rate is higher than the unilateral optimal employment subsidy rate – but its 
associated level of welfare continues to be lower than that achieved via an employment 
subsidy.   
 In a two-country world, both subsidies have procompetitive effects on the industry but 
these are stronger with an entry subsidy that leads to a larger entry. The resulting tougher 
selection forces lead to a smaller increase in the equilibrium mass of firms in the industry 
(and even in a fall in the extensive margin of exports). It is the smaller increase in product 
variety that drives the lower welfare achieved with this type of subsidy. 
 The reaction functions of the two governments when they are both policy active, which 
are illustrated in Figure 8, are upward sloping in  *,   space with the Nash equilibrium 
entailing a positive entry subsidy rate. The Nash equilibrium, however, lies above the 
cooperative solution, hence non-cooperative behaviour leads to over-subsidisation in this 
case.  
  
Figure 8.  Nash and Cooperative solutions with entry subsidy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Pflüger and Suedekum (2013) find that the mass of firms does not change in autarky. The difference in results 
between the two papers mainly hinges on their assumption of (i) quasi-linear preferences (and hence the lack of 
income effects); (ii) the use of lump-sum tax and subsidy; and (iii) fixed labour supply.  
22 The monopolistic distortion is reflected in the wedge between the marginal rates of substitution and 
transformation between the monopolistic good and leisure and/or the outside good: an entry subsidy will affect 
the marginal rate of substitution only via its impact on the proportional income tax rate (and, if financed via 
lump-sum taxation as in Pflüger and Suedekum (2013), it will only affect the marginal rate of transformation).  
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 The intuition behind these results is consistent with that provided by Pflüger and 
Suedekum (2013): an increase in entry subsidy by one government has a selection and a 
fiscal externality effect on its trading partner. Whilst the latter is positive, the former is 
negative and dominates. This gives an incentive to retaliate that results in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium being characterised by over-subsidisation from a global welfare point of view.23  
As is clear from Table A4, although the non-cooperative entry subsidy is larger than the 
corresponding employment subsidy, the former leads to a lower level of welfare than the 
latter.  Thus, despite its direct (and hence stronger) pro-competitive effects, an entry subsidy 
is less effective in increasing employment and welfare than an employment subsidy. 
 
 
7.  Conclusions  
Employment subsidies are an important component of active labour market polices and their 
use by governments has increased in recent years in an attempt to raise (or restore) 
employment levels in the face of an adverse economic climate. This paper has studied their 
effects within a general equilibrium framework characterised by an endogenous level of 
employment and cost heterogeneity among firms.  
 We have shown that intra-industry competitive selection is an important channel in the 
transmission of the effects of employment subsidies on the level of economic activity and 
aggregate efficiency. Importantly, and arguably counterintuitively, international openness 
alters the nature of the effects of the subsidy on intra-industry selection: whilst the subsidy 
has an anti-competitive effect in autarky, it has pro-competitive effects in the open economy 
(akin to those of trade liberalisation) which result in higher average productivity and in a 
larger extensive margin of export.  
 Given the implications of the policy for market entry, aggregate efficiency and welfare, 
and in light of the international externality effects of the policy, governments have an 
incentive to use employment subsidies strategically. When governments subsidise firms 
uniformly, we show that international spillovers consist of both selection and fiscal 
externalities that result in non-cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria that are 
characterised by positive subsidies. Whether the non-cooperative solutions entail levels of 
subsidisation that exceed or fall short of those characterising the cooperative outcome 
depends, however, on the nature of the externality between countries – which in turn is 
affected by how the subsidy is targeted.   
 Importantly, despite stronger pro-competitive effects on industry, an entry subsidy is 
shown to be less effective in increasing employment and welfare than an employment 
subsidy. This is because it offers a less direct way to tackle the monopolistic distortion than 
does an employment subsidy.  
                                                 
23 As can be seen from Table A4, although qualitatively the nature of the international spill-over effects of an 
entry subsidy are similar to those of an employment subsidy, the latter has a stronger negative externality.   
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Appendix  
 
Table A1. Notation used in the model setup (for autarky and the home country only) 
Description Notation   
Fixed cost of production of the differentiated good  (closed economy) 
Fixed cost of production of the differentiated good (domestic & export)  &d x     
Budget share of Y & A & 1- 
Labour supply elasticity (inverse of real wage elasticity of supply) 
Productivity distribution shape parameter (Pareto) 
Firm Level Productivity (differentiated good sector)   
productivity cut-off for marginal firms (closed economy) c 
productivity cut-offs for marginal firms (non-exporting & exporting) & xd     
Average productivity (closed economy)   
Average productivity (non-exporting & exporting) & xd       
Scale coefficient of labour supply 
CES elasticity of substitution 
Profit of a firm producing the differentiated good  (closed economy)  
Profit of a firm producing the differentiated good  (domestic & export) &d x    
Iceberg trade cost for exporting firms 
Per capita demand for homogenous good a 
Aggregate demand for homogenous good A 
Aggregate supply of homogenous good sA  
Mass of entrants F 
Employment ratio  h 
Fixed entry cost f 
Labour requirement for producing the differentiated good (closed economy)    l 
Labour requirement for producing the differentiated good  (domestic & export) &d xl l   
Aggregate labour supply (employment) sL Nh  
Consumer population size  N 
Mass of varieties of differentiated good produced (mass of surviving firms) M 
Mass of varieties of differentiated good produced and exported xM    
Consumer price index P 
price of the homogeneous good AP  
CES price index for Y YP  
Variety prices set by a firm producing the differentiated good  (closed economy) p    
Variety prices set by a firm producing the differentiated good  (non-exporting & exporting) &d xp p         
Revenue of a firm producing the differentiated good (closed economy)   r 
Revenue of a firm producing the differentiated good  (domestic & export) &d xr r       
Labour subsidy received by differentiated good producers  s 
Labour subsidy received by differentiated good producers (domestic & export) &d xs s      
Entry subsidy v 
Income tax rate t 
Wage rate w 
Demand for a variety of differentiated good (closed economy)   y 
Domestic and foreign demand for a domestically produced variety of differentiated good    &d xy y    
Aggregate demand for differentiated good (CES) Y 
Total and per capita utility  u 
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A1. Solution of the closed economy model 
Use 1 1
1 c
   
      
  to write  
1
( ) 1
c
r s
  
     
  and  
 
1
( ) 1 1
c
l
   
         
  respectively as  ( ) 1
1
r s    
      
  and  
1( )
1
l     
      
 , which are then substituted in (13) and (15) to obtain 
   1 1
1
M s t L  
        and 
1
1
sM tL   
       .  For any given M and L 
these solve for t,  given by equation (20), and also imply      
1
1 1
L
M
s s
  
    
      .  
Substituting 1Aw P   and the expression for YP  in (7), the labour supply function in (3) is 
written as  
  
 1
1/
/(1 ) 1
1
1 tL
s
M
N



 

            

 
, 
which, upon replacing L using the result derived above, yields 
 
 
      
 1/(1 )
1/
1 1
1 1 1
1
tM N
s s s
M 


  
     
 

 
                 
  
 
 

. 
Substituting for   and t using (17), (19) and (20), we obtain the following solutions: 
            (1 )( 1)( 1) ( 1) (1 ) ( 1)( 1) ( 1)1 1 1 1M s s s                                                 ,  
            ( 1)( 1) (1 ) ( 1)( 1) ( 1)1 1 1 1L s s s                                                      , 
where  
( 1)
( 1)( 1)
( 1)
N
 
  
   

           and      
/1/ / / 1 / 1f
             . 
Inspection of these reveals that both M and L are concave in s, with L reaching a maximum at 
a lower value of s than does M. It is straightforward to show that the value of s in equation 
(21) maximises L and hence welfare U which is a monotonically increasing function of L.  
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Note that equation (22) is obtained using (12), the expressions for L and M and  
1( )
1
l     
      
  obtained above.  
Table A2. Two-country model setup 
No Description Equation for the home country 
(A1) Consumer’s utility function 
1 1
1 1
a y hU
  
  
              
(A2) Aggregate labour supply 
  1/1s t wL Nh N
P


     
 
(A3) Aggregate demand for homogenous good 
  1 1
A
N t wh
A Na
P
    
(A4) Aggregate demand for differentiated good 
 1
Y
N t wh
Y Ny
P
    
(A5) Consumer price index 1A YP P P
   
(A6) Production function for the homogenous good 
s
AA L  
(A7) Productivity distribution in the differentiated good sector      (1 )1 and   , 1,G g             
(A8) 
Mass of varieties of 
differentiated good (mass of 
surviving firms) 
  1 dM G F  ;   , ,d dM F      
(A9) Mass of varieties of differentiated good exported 
  1x xM G F  ;  , ,x x xM F        
 
(A10) 
Average productivity cut-offs 
are proportional to marginal 
firms’ cut-offs  
1 1
1d d
   
      
 ,   1 1
1x x
   
      
  
(A11) 
Productivity distribution of the 
surviving firms in the 
differentiated good sector 
    1d d
g
G
    ,   
 
 1x x
g
G
     
(A12) 
CES aggregation of 
differentiated goods consumed 
(domestically produced and 
imported) 
   
 
   
*
1
1 1/
1 1/ 1 1/* * *
, ,d x
d d x x xY M y d M y d

 
   
       

 
   
     
 
 
(A13) CES price index for Y    
 
   
*
1
1
1 1* * *
, ,d x
Y d d x x xP M p d M p d

 
   
       

 
   
     
   
(A14) 
Demand for a domestically 
produced differentiated good 
facing a firm with a given 
productivity  
 ( )( ) , ,dd d
Y
py Y
P
  
     
 
(A15) 
Demand for an imported 
differentiated good facing a 
firm with a given productivity 
** *( )( ) , ,xx x
Y
py Y
P
  
       
 
(A16) 
Labour requirement for 
producing the differentiated 
good by a firm with a given 
productivity for its domestic 
production 
     , ,dd d dyl         
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Table A2 continued 
No Description Equation for the home country 
(A17) 
Profit and revenue of a firm 
with a given productivity for 
its domestic production 
       
       
1 ,
; ,
d d d d
d d d d
r s wl
r p y
   
    
  
    
(A18) 
Price set by a firm with a 
given productivity for its 
domestic production 
      
1
, ,
1
d
d d
s w
p
   
       
(A19) 
Labour requirement for 
producing the differentiated 
good by a firm with a given 
productivity for its export  
production 
     , ,xx x xyl          
(A20) 
Profit and revenue of a firm 
with a given productivity for 
its export production 
       
       
1 ,
; ,
x x x x
x x x x
r s wl
r p y
   
    
  
    
(A21) 
Price set by a firm with a 
given productivity for its 
export production 
      
1
, ,
1
x
x x
s w
p
    
    
(A22) Aggregating domestic price of differentiated good 
   
 
 1 1
,d
d d d dM p d Mp
 
 
     
 
   
(A23) Aggregating imported price of differentiated good 
   

 
*
11* * * * * *
,x
x x x x x xM p d M p

 
     
 
   
(A24) 
CES price index for 
differentiated good in terms of 
aggregates 
     111 1* * *Y d d x x xP Mp M p         
(A25) 
Aggregating revenue of 
domestic sales of 
differentiated good 
   
 
 
,d
d d d dM r d Mr
 
    
 
   
(A26) Aggregating revenue of exports of differentiated good 
   
 
 
,x
x x x x x xM r d M r
 
    
 
   
(A27) Aggregating profit of domestic sales of differentiated good 
   
 
 
,d
d d d dM d M
 
      
 
   
(A28) Average profit for domestic sales      1d dd d d dr s w    
  
(A29) Aggregating profit of exports of differentiated good 
   
 
 
,x
x x x x x xM d M
 
      
 
   
(A30) Average profit for exports      1x xx x x xr s w    
  
(A31) 
Labour used in the 
differentiated sector for 
domestically used production  
   
 
 
,d
d d d dM l d Ml
 
    
 
   
(A32) 
Labour used in the 
differentiated sector for export 
production 
   
 
 
,x
x x x x x xM l d M l
 
    
 
   
(A33) 
Labour used in the 
differentiated sector for export 
production 
   
 
 
,x
x x x x x xM l d M l
 
    
 
   
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A2. Derivation of the equations of the two-country model used in the numerical analysis 
Using equations (A16) and (A18), (A17) in Table A2 can be written as  1dd d dr s w    .  Then 
the zero profit condition of marginal non-exporting and exporting firms in home and foreign country 
imply 
      0 1d d d d d d dr s w             (E1) 
      * * * * * * * *0 1d d d d d d dr s w            , (E1*) 
      0 1x x x x x x xr s w            , (E2) 
      * * * * * * * *0 1x x x x x x xr s w            . (E2*) 
 The zero expected profit of entry for the home and foreign country require  
     0d d x x x AM M FP f       , (E3) 
    * * * * * * * * * 0d d x x x AM M F P f       . (E3*) 
 The balanced government budget constraints (equating the subsidy bill with tax revenue) for 
the home and foreign country are  
 d d x x xs wMl s wM x Ntwh  , (E4) 
 * * * * * * * * * * *d d x x xs w M l s w M l Nt w h  . (E4*) 
 The CES price indices in (A13) and the aggregations in (A22) and (A23) imply 
        111 1* * *Y d d x x xP M p M p        , (E5) 
        11 1 1* * * *Y d x x x xP M p M p        . (E5*) 
 Per-capita labour supplies, given by (A2), are 
 
  1/1
Y
t w
h
P


    
, (E6)     
  
1/* *
*
*
1
Y
t w
h
P


     
. (E6*) 
 The other equilibrium conditions which should hold are the labour market equilibrium 
conditions,  
 A d x xL Ml M l Nh    ,         (E7) 
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 * * * * * *A d x xL M l M l Nh   , (E7*) 
the global market equilibrium condition for the homogenous good  
    * * * * * *s sA A A AP A Ff P A F f P A P A     , (E8) 
and the global trade balance, 
      * * *sA x x x x x xP A A Ff M r M r      . (E9) 
 It can be shown that (E8) and (E9) are satisfied – by the implication of Walras law – if (E1) to 
(E7*) hold.  
 Finally, since the homogeneous good is competitively produced under constant return to scales 
condition, is freely traded and is used as numeraire, we have * 1A AP P  , 1Aw P   and 
* * 1Aw P  . Taking account of the latter normalisations and making some substitutions to eliminate 
as many variables as possible, equations in (E1)-E(6*) can be shown to be expressed in the form of 
(E1)-E(6*) below which satisfy labour resource conditions in (E7)-(E7*) and can be solved to 
determine the 12 unknowns  * * * * * *, , , , , , , , , , ,d x d x Y YP P F F h h t t     on the assumption that the 
subsidy rates are treated as exogenous policy instruments.   
        1 1 11 1
1 Y d d d
N t h P s

     

          (E1) 
        1 1 1* * * * * *1 11 Y d d dN t h P s
      
           (E1
*) 
        1 1 1* * * 11 11 Y x x xN t h P s
       
           (E2) 
        1 11 * *1 * *1 11 Y x x xN t h P s
       
           (E2
*) 
 
         
         
1
1 1
* *1
1 1* 1
1
1 1
1 1
1
1 1
1 1
d d Y d d d
x x Y x x x
N t h
s P s
N t h
s P s f

  
    
      
       

  
    
               
               
 (E3) 
 
         
         
* *1
1 1* * * * * *
1
11* * * *1 * * *
1
1 1
1 1
1
1 1
1 1
d d Y d d d
x x Y x x x
N t h
s P s
N t h
s P s f
   
   
      
       
   
   
               
               
 (E3*) 
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       
       
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x x Y x x x
s F N t h P s
s F N t h P s Nth
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  
    
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       
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  
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                
                
 (E4) 
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                
                
 (E4*) 
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1
1
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  
    
   
   
   
            
       
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   
   
   
            
       
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Y
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

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*
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 The above 12 equations are used as in our numerical analysis. To see the recursive nature of 
the model and to derive equations (32) and (33), note that (E1) and (E1*) can be used to eliminate 
   1 11
1 Y
N t h P

 

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1
1* * *1
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N t h P
  
       from (E2)-(E3
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1
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1
1
x x x
d d d
s
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 
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
               
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1
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1
1
d d d
x x x
s
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 
  

               
 which yield (32), and 
     11 1
1d d d x x x
s s f       
         
 and     * ** * * * * * ** 11 1 1d d d x x xs s f                  which are 
in (33). 
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Table A3.  Comparing the equilibrium solutions of the two-country model for different cases: the role of  and    
 Variables 
Benchmark Equilibrium with no Subsidy Cooperative Equilibrium with Uniform Subsidy Nash Equilibrium with Uniform Subsidy 
Initial Case 
= 3.4 
= 1.3 
 falls by 5%
= 3.23 
= 1.3 
 falls by 5%
= 3.4 
= 1.235 
Initial Case 
= 3.4 
= 1.3 
 falls by 5%
= 3.23 
= 1.3 
 falls by 5%
= 3.4 
= 1.235 
Initial Case 
= 3.4 
= 1.3 
 falls by 5%
= 3.23 
= 1.3 
 falls by 5%
= 3.4 
= 1.235 
s 0  0 0 0.141 0.138 0.141 0.1065 0.108 0.096 
t 0  0 0 0.093264 0.089964 0.093264 0.069499 0.069564 0.062392 
h 0.626221  0.666732 0.630406 0.627455 0.667994 0.631649 0.627373 0.667929 0.63151 
d 1.576315  1.802935 1.59898 1.507403 1.721922 1.529077 1.524962 1.740256 1.552213 
x 2.624806  3.002163 2.529419 2.510056 2.867262 2.418839 2.539295 2.897793 2.455439 
F 32.31272  36.21378 32.52871 29.35685 33.01826 29.55308 30.12235 33.75514 30.55257 
M 6.876808  5.395827 6.594781 7.27327 5.707304 6.974983 7.174764 5.638442 6.851928 
xM 1.214627  1.039349 1.386744 1.284653 1.099346 1.466693 1.267254 1.086082 1.440817 
PY 0.208905  0.178603 0.205455 0.183934 0.158001 0.180896 0.190042 0.16248 0.188731 
 d d dL Ml   289.9721  297.2097 278.0799 306.6896 314.3662 294.1118 302.5359 310.5733 288.923 
 x x xxL M l   102.4336  114.4976 116.9487 108.3391 121.107 123.6911 106.8718 119.6458 121.5089 
  / sd xL L L 0.626625  0.6175 0.626625 0.661448 0.651912 0.661448 0.652575 0.644109 0.649921 
 See Table A4 for the case of unilateral policy by the home country when the foreign country is policy inactive. 
 The parameter values used in the calibrations are: N = 1000,  = 0.8,   = 2,   = 8.9245,   = 3.8, d =2.5, x =5.0 and  f =3.36.  
 The solutions were obtained using the MCP/PATH engine in GAMS; the robustness of these solutions are confirmed by extensive sensitivity analyses. The solution 
values for all other variables are available from the authors on request. 
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Table A4.  Comparing the Optimal Policy Values of Variables in Different Cases: the role of different subsidies 
 
 
 The columns in the Unilateral Policy refer to the case in which the home country acts unilaterally while the foreign country remains 
policy inactive.  Figures in square brackets are the corresponding values for the foreign country. 
 The parameter values used in the calibrations are as reported in Table A3, with = 3.4 and = 1.3.   
 The solutions were obtained using the MCP/PATH engine in GAMS; the robustness of these solutions are confirmed by extensive sensitivity analyses.  
Variables 
No Policy Unilateral Policy Cooperative Policy Nash Policy 
Benchmark Employment Subsidy, s 
Entry 
Subsidy,  
Employment 
Subsidy, s 
Entry 
Subsidy,  
Employment 
Subsidy, s 
Entry 
Subsidy,  
s,  0  0.0675
[0]
0.165
[0]
0.141 0.063 0.1065 0.2205
t 0  0.061378
[0]
0.042784
[0]
0.093264 0.011522 0.069499 0.04675
h 0.626221  0.632891
[0.61641]
0.631018
[0.618848]
0.627455 0.62637 0.627373 0.625145
d   1.576315  1.62377
[1.523872]
1.718958
[1.536813]
1.507403 1.606774 1.524962 1.696141
x   2.624806  2.307872
[2.972826]
2.559028
[2.862328]
2.510056 2.675524 2.539295 2.824333
F 32.31272  44.19013
[18.26889]
48.69677
[22.43769]
29.35685 34.09604 30.12235 39.44735
M 6.876808  8.502408
[4.362014]
7.719658
[5.205555]
7.27327 6.799197 7.174764 6.544062
xM   1.214627  2.572795
[0.449714]
1.99547
[0.62825]
1.284653 1.200919 1.267254 1.155856
yP   0.208905  0.187957
[0.217316]
0.194055
[0.21518]
0.183934 0.205777 0.190042 0.197616
( )d d dL Ml  
 
289.9721  216.9724
[37.92585]
168.2846
[52.9824]
306.6896 101.2775 302.5359 97.47715
( )x x xL Ml  
 
102.4336  575.4906
[221.8574]
493.7969
[272.483]
108.3391 387.9768 106.8718 373.4184
( ) / sd xL L L
 
0.626625  0.909304
[0.359918]
0.78254
[0.44031]
0.661448 0.619405 0.652575 0.59733
